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A B S T R A C T
Distributional cost eﬀectiveness analysis is a new method that can help to redesign prevention programmes by
explicitly modelling the distribution of health opportunity costs as well as the distribution of health beneﬁts.
Previously we modelled cardiovascular disease (CVD) screening audit data from Liverpool, UK to see if the city
could redesign its cardiovascular screening programme to enhance its cost eﬀectiveness and equity. Building on
this previous analysis, we explicitly examined the distribution of health opportunity costs and we looked at new
redesign options co-designed with stakeholders. We simulated four plausible scenarios: a) no CVD screening, b)
‘current’ basic universal CVD screening as currently implemented, c) enhanced universal CVD screening with
‘increased’ population-wide delivery, and d) ‘universal plus targeted’ with top-up delivery to the most deprived
ﬁfth. We also compared assumptions around whether displaced health spend would come from programmes that
might beneﬁt the poor more and how much health these programmes would generate. The main outcomes were
net health beneﬁt and change in the slope index of inequality (SII) in QALYs per 100,000 person years. ‘Universal
plus targeted’ dominated ‘increased’ and ‘current’ and also reduced health inequality by −0.65 QALYs per
100,000 person years. Results are highly sensitive to assumptions about opportunity costs and, in particular,
whether funding comes from health care or local government budgets. By analysing who loses as well as who
gains from expenditure decisions, distributional cost eﬀectiveness analysis can help decision makers to redesign
prevention programmes in ways that improve health and reduce health inequality.
1. Introduction
There is an international agenda around cardiovascular disease
(CVD) prevention, with substantial screening programmes in many
countries including Japan, Scotland and the United States. However,
the optimal composition and implementation of a CVD screening pro-
gramme remains unclear. One such example is in England (“NHS Health
Checks”) where there is a debate over whether the programme is cost
eﬀective and/or equitable. There are concerns that screening pro-
grammes may tend to increase health inequalities, insofar as uptake is
disproportionately higher among people from socially advantaged
groups, a phenomenon known as ‘intervention generated inequality’
(Lorenc et al., 2013).
1.1. NHS Health Checks
The English cardiovascular screening programme (NHS Health
Checks), has been implemented in England from April 2009 onwards
and around 5.8 million people in England participated from April
2014–May 2018, 37% of those eligible (Public Health England, 2018).
Cardiovascular screening is oﬀered on a cycle, with people invited once
every ﬁve years starting from their 40th birthday. Most local govern-
ment public health teams commission this programme from local
General Practitioners (GPs, family doctors).
One of the objectives of cardiovascular screening is to tackle health
inequalities but the true equity impact of these programmes has not
been established. In the present study we looked at equity impacts as
well as overall eﬀectiveness, as recommended by several methods
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guides (Claxton et al., 2014; Sanders et al., 2016). Cookson et al. (2017)
outlined the main methodologies for incorporating equity impacts into
cost eﬀectiveness analysis (CEA): equity impact analysis, where dis-
tributional impacts on diﬀerent groups are analysed; and equity trade-
oﬀ analysis, where trade-oﬀs between improving total health and re-
ducing health inequality are explicitly quantiﬁed, for example by
counting the total health opportunity cost of pursuing a more equitable
policy or by using an equity parameter that represents commissioners'
degree of concern for reducing health inequality. There are examples of
equity trade-oﬀs with programmes like bowel cancer screening being a
‘win-lose’ - cost eﬀective but increasing inequalities (Asaria et al.,
2015), while treatments for mesothelioma may be a ‘lose-win’, having a
high incremental cost per QALY, but reducing inequalities (Shah et al.,
2013). The challenge is identifying whether current or future Health
Checks scenarios are ‘win-wins’; ‘win-lose’; ‘lose-win’; or ‘lose-lose’.
In the present analysis, we build on our previous study which found
that targeting health checks to deprived populations would be more
cost eﬀective and equitable than having a universal oﬀer (Kypridemos
et al., 2018). Our previous study modelled change in slope index of
inequality (SII) and incremental cost eﬀectiveness ratios (ICERs) but did
not factor in health foregone from healthcare spend. The present study
goes further by including sector-speciﬁc estimates of health foregone
from taking money away from other medical and public health pro-
grammes. In England, this health production cost ratio may be around
£2000/QALY for public health programmes (Owen et al., 2011, 2017)
which are typically commissioned by local government, and around
£13000/QALY for medical interventions in the NHS (Claxton et al.,
2013). However, few studies consider diﬀerential sectoral health pro-
duction costs in this way. Health production costs may also be adjusted
for deprivation as people from deprived areas use more health re-
sources, for example NHS spending is 20% higher in the most deprived
quintile group, so for every unit of cost diverted, a greater proportion of
the health foregone may fall to this group (Asaria et al., 2016). We
wanted to test whether assumptions about sector-speciﬁc health pro-
duction costs, and socioeconomic group-speciﬁc health production
costs would change the results of which scenario was most cost eﬀec-
tive. Often, health foregone from diverted spend is not factored into
cost eﬀectiveness analysis in this way, including in our previous study
(Asaria et al., 2016).
This study therefore aims to show how this novel set of methods can
be used in practice to redesign a city-wide cardiovascular screening
programme.
2. Methods
2.1. Overview
The IMPACTNCD model is a dynamic, stochastic, microsimulation
model with health economic outcomes (costs and QALYs) measured
across socioeconomic groups (deprivation quintiles or ﬁfths). It has
been described and validated previously (Kypridemos et al., 2016).
2.2. Data sources
The IMPACTNCD model was populated with data projecting
Liverpool demographics (by age, sex, and national Index of Multiple
Deprivation quintile groups, QIMD). A subsample of Health Survey for
England (HSE) participants living in Northwest England was utilised to
estimate current and past population exposures to seven CVD risk fac-
tors; inadequate fruit & vegetable consumption, physical inactivity,
smoking, excess body mass index (BMI), hypertension, high cholesterol,
and diabetes mellitus, for years 2002 to 2014. Then, past risk factor
exposures were projected to the year 2040 stratiﬁed by age, sex, and
QIMD to estimate future population exposures. Subsequently, the dif-
ferent scenarios were modelled through their eﬀect on these risk factors
for selected individuals or the whole synthetic population.
2.3. Co-production of scenarios
Four performance scenarios were designed in collaboration with
stakeholders from Liverpool City Council to reﬂect the real-world de-
cision challenges that they were grappling with. These four scenarios
varied the coverage – the proportion of the population invited for a
health check every year, and the uptake – the proportion of invitees
attending cardiovascular screening. Optimal annual performance would
be coverage of 20% (as it is a rolling ﬁve year programme with 20% of
the population invited each year) and uptake of 100%. However, we
used 20% coverage and 66% uptake as a maximum that was considered
to be achievable. We compared a ‘no health checks’ scenario with the
‘current’ performance scenario of cardiovascular screening performance
in Liverpool (where coverage was 13.8% per year, uptake was 32.3%);
a hypothetical scenario of ‘increased’ performance (coverage increased
to 20%, uptake increased to 66%); and a hypothetical ‘universal plus
targeted’ top-up scenario, where coverage in the most deprived ﬁfth
would increase to 20% per year and uptake would increase to 66% per
year, but coverage and uptake in the rest of the population would not
Table 1
Detail of Modelled Health Check scenarios with 4 sets of alternate assumptions around health production costs.
Scenario Main assumptions Intervention costs Health production costs
Current (all assumptions were based on
evidence from local audit)
Coverage: 13.8% £5.11 per invitation 1a. £13000/QALY unadjusted for deprivation
1b. £13000/QALY adjusted for deprivation
2a. Hybrid of £13000/QALY NHS medical spend
and £2000/QALY Public Health spend, unadjusted
for deprivation
2b. Hybrid of £13000/QALY NHS medical spend
and £2000/QALY Public Health spend, adjusted for
deprivation
Uptake: 32.3% £13.28 per
participant
Prescription rate: 9.1% (low risk) 25.8% (middle
risk) 41.7% (high risk)
Increased (coverage and uptake assumptions
were based on existing targets)
Coverage increased from 13.8% to 20% £5.11 per invitation
Uptake increased from 32.3% to 66% £15.00 per
participant
Prescription: 9.1% (low risk) 25.8% (middle risk)
41.7% (high risk)
Universal plus targeted (includes current)
(based on existing targets to deprived
areas)
Coverage: 20% for the most deprived national IMD
ﬁfth and 13.8% for all other ﬁfths
£5.11 per invitation
Uptake: 66% for the most deprived national IMD
ﬁfth and 32.3% for all other ﬁfths
£15.00 per
participant
Assumes risk proﬁle of attendees in the most
deprived national IMD is similar to risk proﬁle of
the population.
Prescription: 9.1% (low risk) 25.8% (middle risk)
41.7% (high risk)
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increase (Table 1).
2.4. Intervention costs
The intervention cost in the ‘current’ scenario was £5.11 per in-
vitation and £15.00 per attendance. Our stakeholders suggested that
the extra eﬀort involved for the hypothetical ‘increased’ and ‘universal
plus targeted’ scenarios would attract slightly higher costs of £15.00 per
attendance than the current cost of £13.28 per attendance. For the
‘increased’ and ‘universal plus targeted’ scenarios, changes in perfor-
mance occurred from 2017 onwards (see Appendix and previous paper
for full details of modelling methods).
2.5. Outcomes
The main outcomes were net health beneﬁts (Stinnett and Mullahy,
1998), and change in slope index in inequalities (SII) per 100,000
person-years. We also looked at ICERs (incremental cost eﬀectiveness
ratios – incremental net cost per QALY gained) and gross health ben-
eﬁts. QALYs in the model were measured across the whole population
aged 30–84 and the quality of life decrements were deﬁcit measures for
CVD and diabetes only. We did not include people under 30 or over 84
as CVD prevention has limited impact in those age groups. The costs
were intervention costs, and ongoing CVD and diabetes health and
social care costs. Costs and QALYs were discounted at 3.5% per annum
and adjusted for inﬂation to 2016 pounds sterling. For socioeconomic
status, we used national quintile groups (IMD ﬁfths) of index of mul-
tiple deprivation (IMD) scores, based on the small area (lower layer
super output area) where individuals lived. We used IMD 2010 which
was current when the simulation begins in 2011. When capturing
trends, older versions of the IMD were used and assumed to be similar
to 2010 version. The dynamic model was run for a 30-year time horizon
from 2011 to 2040. This time horizon was chosen to give cardiovascular
screening time to imbed and produce health gains.
Net health beneﬁts were calculated in the standard way by com-
bining changes in QALYs with changes in net costs, converted into
QALYs based on a health production cost (Kypridemos et al., 2016). For
this study, we made two enhancements to standard health economic
methods. First, we compared a standard health production cost with a
sector-speciﬁc hybrid health production cost, to account for the dif-
ferential health impact of the money diverted from NHS medical bud-
gets, and local government public health budgets. The English Cardio-
vascular screening programmes are paid for out of local government
budgets – the same budgets which also pay for public health pro-
grammes like the Healthy Child Programme, drug and alcohol treat-
ment, and smoking cessation. At a broader level, local government also
pay for child and adult social care, and contribute to education and
policing. For each of the three uptake scenarios we tested four diﬀerent
sets of health production cost assumptions to calculate net health
beneﬁts (Table 1). One assumption used £13000 per QALY for all
medical and public health costs based on Claxton et al., 2013, while a
hybrid assumption used £13000 NHS medical spend per QALY lost and
£2000 local government public health spend per QALY lost, with the
latter based on the median cost/QALY for public health interventions
modelled for NICE from 2006 to 2016 (Owen et al., 2011).
Secondly, we tested whether the results changed if we weight health
production costs by deprivation. This recognises that deprived groups
use up healthcare more quickly, so any budget diverted may come
disproportionately from deprived groups. Therefore, for the two health
production cost assumptions (£13000 and hybrid) two additional al-
ternative adjustments were explored for the socioeconomic distribution
of health production costs. First, unadjusted, which assumed an equal
health burden across IMD ﬁfths, and second, adjusted, where health
production costs were based on estimates of the ratio of NHS resource
use across IMD quintile groups from 2014/15 (Asaria, 2017). When the
health production costs are adjusted for inequalities it means that,
when £13000 of health spend was diverted across the whole popula-
tion, the most deprived ﬁfth lose 12% more of this spend and the re-
sulting QALYs that could have been produced. The rate at which
healthcare spend is used is £11,564 per QALY gained in the most de-
prived ﬁfth, compared with £14,471 in the least deprived ﬁfth. Or in
the hybrid scenario when £2000 of public health spend was diverted
across the whole, every £1779 diverted takes away a QALY from the
most deprived ﬁfth, compared with £2226 per QALY in the least de-
prived ﬁfth (Stinnett and Mullahy, 1998).
So all together this gave four alternative assumptions for health
production costs; 1a. £13000/QALY for both medical and public health
spend, unadjusted for inequalities; 1b. £13000/QALY average for both
medical and public health spend, adjusted for inequalities; 2a. hybrid of
£13000/QALY for medical spend and £2000/QALY for public health
spend, unadjusted for inequalities; 2b. hybrid of £13000/QALY for
medical spend and £2000/QALY for public health spend, adjusted for
inequalities.
To measure equity impacts we used the adjusted reduction in slope
index of inequality (SII, the linear regression coeﬃcient) of rates of
incremental net health beneﬁt per 100,000 person years across IMD
ﬁfths. To account for population size diﬀerences in each ﬁfth, each IMD
ﬁfth (quintile group) was characterized by a ridit value that corre-
sponds to the average cumulative frequency of the IMD ﬁfth (Bross,
1958). So for example an SII reduction of 0.5 means that the gradient
(the estimated linear regression coeﬃcient reﬂecting the diﬀerence
between the most and least deprived person) has reduced by 0.5
QALYs/100,000 population. Liverpool has around 60% of its popula-
tion in the most deprived quintile group. Because the Liverpool popu-
lation had less than 0.5% of its population in the least deprived IMD
ﬁfth nationally (quintile 1), comparisons were made only on IMD ﬁfths
2–5, where 5 was the most deprived (see chart in Appendix). This was
because even with a 30-year time horizon, the outcomes in quintile 1
were subject to a high level of stochastic uncertainty.
3. Results
The ICERs were reported in our previous paper and appendices and
are shown in Table 2 (Kypridemos et al., 2018a). Compared with a ‘no
Health Checks’ scenario over a time horizon of 30 years from 2011 to
2040, the incremental cost eﬀectiveness ratio (ICER) of the current
Health Checks scenario was approximately £11,000 per QALY, £7400
per QALY for the ‘increased’ scenario, and £1500 per QALY for the
‘universal plus targeted’ scenario. Reducing the time horizon to 20 years
increased these ICERs to around £21,000 per QALY for the current
scenario, £13000 per QALY for the ‘increased’ scenario, and £14,000
per QALY for the ‘universal plus targeted’ scenario. Compared with the
current Health Checks scenario over a 30 year time horizon, the ICER
for the ‘increased’ scenario was dominant (£1900 saved per QALY
gained), while the ‘universal plus targeted’ scenario was also dominant
– it was cheaper (cost £2million less) and more eﬀective (delivered 280
more QALYs). The ‘universal plus targeted’ scenario also dominated the
‘increased’ scenario – it cost around £3million less and delivered 150
more QALYs. Over 20 years, ‘increased’ was dominant when compared
to ‘universal plus targeted’, indicating that the ‘universal plus targeted’
scenario takes more than 20 years to become the dominant scenario.
These results are presented in more detail in the previously published
ﬁndings paper, which also includes additional scenarios (Kypridemos
et al., 2018a).
3.1. Change in outcomes when using diﬀerent health production costs
Fig. 1 shows the gross health beneﬁts (total QALYs gained per
100,000 person years only, irrespective of costs) and SII reduction for
the three scenarios with 50% uncertainty intervals, or interquartile
ranges. The gross health beneﬁts ranged from 2.4 QALYs (95% Un-
certainty Interval −4.5 to 11.1) per 100,000 person years for the
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current scenario to 3.9 (−6.2 to 16.5) for the ‘increased’ scenario and
5.6 (−4.2 to 18.7) for the ‘universal plus targeted’ scenario. The gross
health beneﬁts were greater for the ‘universal plus targeted’ than the
‘increased’ scenario because the ‘universal plus targeted’ actually en-
gages with a larger number of people who are high risk of CVD in the
city. While all three scenarios improve health overall, only ‘universal
plus targeted’ has a positive SII reduction, i.e. it will reduce health in-
equalities.
Using sector-speciﬁc health production costs changed the direction
of results. Figs. 2 and 3 show the net health beneﬁt at diﬀerent health
production costs, adjusted and unadjusted for deprivation. With a
health production cost of £13000/QALY for both public health and
medical spend, the net health beneﬁt for the current scenario was ne-
gative (−0.49 QALYs per 100,000 person years) the ‘increased’ is close
to zero (0.23 QALYs/100,000 person-years), while the net health ben-
eﬁt for the ‘targeted’ scenario is positive at 4.5 QALYs/100,000 person-
years.
Using the sector-speciﬁc hybrid health production cost of £2000 for
public health spend and £13000 for medical spend means that all net
health beneﬁt values are negative, meaning that cardiovascular
screening would be reducing total population health because the CVD-
related health beneﬁts and cost savings would be less than the value of
investing in something else. In this sector-speciﬁc hybrid scenario the
equity impact is reversed; the ‘universal plus targeted’ moves from
being in the North East ‘win-win’ quadrant in Fig. 2, to the South West
‘lose-lose’ quadrant in Fig. 3; this is because at £2000 per QALY, the
value of the health lost through spend is much more heavily weighted
in the equation than the value of the health gains. In the hybrid scenario
the ‘increased’ and ‘universal plus targeted’ would be assessed as in-
ferior to the ‘current’ or indeed to a ‘no health checks’ scenario because
the ‘increased’ and ‘universal plus targeted’ involve more total public
health spend producing a negative return on investment, and therefore
the potential health loss is greater.
Changes in the SII in net health beneﬁt between IMD ﬁfths become
slightly smaller when using deprivation-adjusted health production
costs. For the ‘increased’ scenario at a health production cost of £13000
per QALY, adjusting for deprivation changes the direction of the SII
reduction from 0.43 to−0.65. This is because the ICER for this scenario
Table 2
Modelled results of scenarios: Net health beneﬁts (QALYs gained per 100,000 person-years), change in SII in net health beneﬁts (QALYs per 100,000 person years),
median net costs, median incremental QALYs gained, and median ICER, for three Health Check scenarios (current, increased, universal plus targeted [shown as
‘targeted’]), compared with ‘No Health Checks’. Modelled data for Liverpool, 2011-040. Shown for £13000 per QALY health production cost, and hybrid health
production cost (£2000 for Public Health and £13000 for NHS medical spend).
Scenario Health production cost Median net
costs
Median incremental
QALYs gained
Median
ICER
£13000 Hybrid
Median change in SII in
NHB (QALYs per
100,000 person years)
Median net health
beneﬁt (QALYs per
100,000 person years)
Median change in SII
(QALYs per 100,000
person years)
Median net health
beneﬁt (QALYs per
100,000 person years)
Current unadjusted −6.469 −0.493 12.495 −19.45 £3,438,881 218 £10,608
Current adjusted −7.259 −0.755 6.472 −21.01
Increased adjusted −0.649 −0.043 13.448 −37.65 £4,397,549 360 £6654
Increased
unadjusted
0.431 0.226 23.706 −34.84
Targeted adjusted 11.780 4.497 −14.896 −27.58 £1,277,495 498 £1436
Targeted unadjusted 11.787 4.476 −6.322 −24.84
All scenarios are compared with counterfactual of no Health Checks.
Median ICERs are based on joint distribution of costs and incremental QALYs, which is why they do not equal [median costs] divided by [median QALYs].
QALYs; quality adjusted life years.
ICER; Incremental Cost Eﬀectiveness Ratio (cost per QALY gained).
SII; slope index of inequality.
NHB; net health beneﬁt.
Fig. 1. Gross health beneﬁts (Net QALYs gained per 100,000 person-years) and
change in SII in net QALYs gained per 100,000 person years for three Health
Check scenarios (current, increased, universal plus targeted [shown as ‘tar-
geted’]), compared with ‘No Health Checks’ scenario. Modelled data for
Liverpool, 2011–2040. Ellipses depict 50% uncertainty intervals.
Fig. 2. Net health beneﬁts (QALYs gained per 100,000 person-years) and
change in SII in net health beneﬁts (QALYs per 100,000 person years) for three
Health Check scenarios (current, increased, universal plus targeted [shown as
‘targeted’]), compared with ‘No Health Checks’. Modelled data for Liverpool,
2011–040. Ellipses depict 50% uncertainty intervals. Note: based on £13000
per QALY health production costs adjusted and unadjusted for deprivation
(assumption 1a and 1b).
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is very close to the health production cost (they are both around
£13000). Adjusting for inequalities also slightly reduces the change in
SII for the ‘targeted’ scenario but it still would be reducing inequalities.
4. Discussion
This study demonstrates how a cardiovascular screening pro-
gramme might be redesigned if reducing health inequalities was a
primary aim. We started with real world data for a city with a high level
of CVD risk, which should be a good candidate for cardiovascular
screening to improve health and reduce inequalities. Previous studies
estimated that cardiovascular screening was likely to be cost eﬀective.
Cardiovascular screening in England was prospectively modelled by the
Department of Health (DH) in 2008 (Department of Health, 2008)
which found an incremental cost-eﬀectiveness ratio (ICER) of £2480
per QALY which may be regarded as being very cost eﬀective. Other
papers have found ICERs from £900/QALY (Hinde et al., 2017) to
around £23,000/QALY (Crossan et al., 2017). Our results were similar
to this, in that cardiovascular screening is likely to be considered cost
eﬀective using the traditional NICE threshold of £20000 to £30000 per
QALY gained.
However, as in other studies (Chang et al., 2019), this analysis
found that the current performance of cardiovascular screening in Li-
verpool is not equitable and may not even be cost eﬀective depending
on the health production cost or ‘shadow price’ applied. If performance
was increased (more higher risk people attending and given lifestyle
advice or medication), then the programme would be more likely to be
cost eﬀective over the period studied, but would still increase in-
equalities (it could be a win-lose). However, if cardiovascular screening
were targeted to the most deprived ﬁfth, it could be a win-win; this
would increase the cost eﬀectiveness and reduce inequalities.
This study adds to the literature that the choice of ‘exchange rate’
between health production cost and QALYs, and the decision to con-
sider the distribution of health production costs, can change the di-
rection of the results. So for the current scenario of cardiovascular
screening implementation if we assume that each £13000 diverted from
NHS medical spend is one QALY lost (based on Claxton et al., 2013), the
programme produces a net health loss. This loss becomes even greater if
we combine this with an assumption that £2000 diverted from public
health means one QALY lost (based on Owen et al. (2011)). Under this
hybrid scenario the equity impact is reversed, because any health gains
are outweighed by the more equitable health gains that may be
achieved by spending the money on another public health programme.
Our study is the ﬁrst to apply sector-speciﬁc opportunity costs to dis-
tributional cost eﬀectiveness analysis in this way and demonstrates how
it can make a huge diﬀerence to the direction of the results.
Ongoing work to establish the true marginal cost of a QALY in a
healthcare system, or in public health, will therefore be crucial for
decision makers in knowing whether interventions such as cardiovas-
cular screening represent value for money. If we assume that every
£2000 of public health spend achieves one QALY, then increasing in-
vestment in cardiovascular screening would not be cost eﬀective. And if
we assume that current public health spend is used up more quickly by
deprived groups, then increasing investment in cardiovascular
screening will exacerbate health inequalities. A recent working paper
estimated the marginal incremental cost eﬀectiveness ratio for local
authority public health spend as £3800 per QALY (Martin and Lomas,
n.d.) so the true ﬁgure is likely to be closer to £2000 than £15,000.
This study has shown how considering the distribution of health
gains foregone across deprivation groups can change the direction of
the results in terms of the equity impact of healthcare programmes,
particularly if the ICER is very close to the health production cost. In the
UK, it is rare that programmes are funded out of new money.
Researchers should therefore consider the losers as well as the bene-
ﬁciaries from any investment that is displaced to fund a programme; for
instance, cutting smoking cessation programmes to invest in cardio-
vascular screening. Diverting money from a programme that reduces
health inequalities to one that does not means that people in deprived
areas lose out twice.
Non communicable diseases like cardiovascular disease are the
leading cause of death and disability globally, including now in low
income countries. Health economies have got better at improving sur-
vival, but less good at prevention, hence people are living longer with
multiple conditions. Preventing disease and delaying the onset of ill-
health is urgently required to stem demand for health and care services.
Alongside structural interventions, screening programmes like the
English Health Checks programme have potential but this evidence
adds to the literature that such programmes should adopt ‘propor-
tionate universalism’ in targeting in proportion to need.
4.1. Strengths
A strength is that the dynamic model measures diﬀerences in costs
and outcomes over the whole running time of the model so we can
determine how long the programme takes to become cost eﬀective. Our
dynamic model may ﬁnd cardiovascular screening is less eﬀective than
other studies because key CVD risk factors are generally showing a
secular trend of reducing over time.
4.2. Limitations
Though the model includes risk of death from all causes, this study
only uses a deﬁcit measure comparing QALYs lost and gained from CVD
and diabetes and through ageing, not from other speciﬁc diseases.
Furthermore, Liverpool only has a very small number of people in the
most aﬄuent IMD ﬁfth which means that the slope index of inequalities
was only measured for ﬁfths 2–5. One way of accounting for this would
have been to use local deprivation quintiles for Liverpool instead of
national. However, this was not possible as some model inputs came
from national datasets.
4.3. Implications for further research
Future studies may use a social welfare function (SWF) that maps
from the net health beneﬁts for each ﬁfth to the overall net health
beneﬁt to society. This becomes more important when choosing the
best strategy from several ‘win-win’ scenarios. One study using an on-
line survey found that the general population in England weighed
Fig. 3. Net health beneﬁts (QALYs gained per 100,000 person-years) and
change in SII in net health beneﬁts (QALYs per 100,000 person years) for three
Health Check scenarios (current, increased, universal plus targeted [shown as
‘targeted’]), compared with ‘no Health Checks’ scenario. Modelled data for
Liverpool, 2011–2040. Ellipses depict 50% uncertainty intervals. Note: based
on a hybrid of £13000 per QALY health production costs for medical spend and
£2000 per QALY for public health spend, adjusted and unadjusted for depri-
vation (assumption 2a and 2b).
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health gains for the most deprived ﬁfth around 7 times greater than in
the least deprived (Robson et al., 2017).
Future studies of cardiovascular screening could model inequalities
between ethnic groups, gender diﬀerences, or other PROGRESS-Plus
factors (Welch et al., 2012). Understanding more about the drivers of
inequalities in health spending (e.g. supply, demand, compressed years)
may tell us more about how the health foregone from disinvestment
varies by socioeconomic group. Understanding more about what GPs
need to do to increase uptake in deprived groups, and the true addi-
tional costs of ‘going the last mile’ to get the most vulnerable people to
attend Health Checks would be valuable.
5. Conclusions
Based on real world data from Liverpool and considering sector and
deprivation speciﬁc opportunity costs, current implementation of uni-
versal cardiovascular screening does not reduce inequalities. Deprived
populations could therefore lose out twice, as cardiovascular screening
programmes may be favoured over other programmes that would ac-
tually reduce inequalities. In contrast, redesigning with a universal plus
targeted approach might be more cost eﬀective and would reduce in-
equalities. Most importantly, this study has shown that understanding
the true opportunity costs for diﬀerent sectors of the economy is im-
portant as it can vastly aﬀect the cost eﬀectiveness calculation.
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